characterise the state and class struggle in Zimbabwe. 1 This theorisation describes a petty bourgeoisie in charge of an array of state apparatuses in the immediate aftermath of a war of liberation from a 'white-settler-colonial' state-society complex. This class was schizophrenic because it had to condemn white capital yet rely on it for a material base. 2 For Yeros, the (conditional) success of a 'semi-proletarian' land revolution offered a way out of such a messy conundrum. In this edition of Historical Materialism, Brian Raftopoulos and Ian Phimister outline a deep and multilayered crisis, the resolution of which will likely take more than the 127,000 potentially smallcommodity-producing farmers (and perhaps 7,300 middling ones) 3 on which Yeros's hopes rest, even if households, on 'A1' plots with use rights and common grazing land, and 7,260 'capitalists' with leasehold and a 'proposed option to buy'. State media estimate up to 300,000 A1 farmers. ' (2003, p. 214) , and 'romanticism about "peasants" or indeed "worker-peasants" or general assumptions of the superior productive virtues of either large-scale or small-scale farming' is debunked (p. 218). On contemporary Zimbabwe, Bernstein writes that 'it is pointless -or counterproductive -to present it, and its current moment, as the pursuit of struggle and exercise of will of any coherent, and idealised, collective class or other subject/agent, whether "peasant", rural "community" or "worker-peasant". Such views are supported by neither the social nor political "facts"'. In 2003, he wrote that the land invasions point to a 'significant, and "objectively progressive," expression of a (new) agrarian question of labour ' (p. 220 ), yet cautions that benefits will be contingent on extensive state provisioning or the relatively quick accumulation processes of a highly differentiated, yet productive, formation. In 2004a, he was 'unconvinced by the sweeping nature of [Yeros's] . . . "semi-proletarianization thesis"' and more critical of 'populist ideologies [and by implication practices], of various stripes and in various ways, claim[ing] to articulate the injuries of exploitation, oppression and injustice generated by "structural inequality of resource access" in the countryside, and . . . address [ing] them through redistributive land reforms ' (pp. 205-6) . He was also clearer that 'employment as well as productivity benefits (and macroeconomic benefits such as foreign exchange earnings) are under direct threat from any redistributive land reform that divides up . . . [large-scale capitalist farming] enterprises ' (pp. 207-8) . Such empirical questions rest on evidence of increasing productivity and distribution. There is no evidence to date to show improvement on any of these scores in Zimbabwe, except in the case of a conspicuously consuming 'élite' (wealthier than a 'middle class' but with little interest in the production, signifying a 'proper' bourgeoisie) with its base in 'trade' and rent-seeking at best, speculation and crime at worst. Does this group represent the embryonic stage of a productive bourgeoisie, creating an industrial proletariat along with it? Reports on the new capitalists' farms suggest much lower and wages and worse conditions than those that afflicted the now decimated agricultural workers historically. they would be producing optimally and creating a surplus large enough (in proportional terms) to answer the classical agrarian question. 4 
